General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
Because Lincoln felt that McClellan lacked the aggressiveness required to successfully defeat the Confederate army. McClellan was very meticulous and patient. He did not chase Confederate General Robert E. Lee after defeating his troops at Antietam. Lincoln got tired of McClellan's patience and decided to replace him with Ambrose Burnside.
During the seven day battles
Their defeat by McClellan at Antietam.
Lee applied the strategy of using the field fortification as a cornerstone of the maneuver, who was a "reenactment" of the ancient Romans strategy, particularly that of Julius Caesar, of which Lee was a scholar. He ordered his army to dig entrenchments but not to make themselves buried into but to do systematic use of the trenches and field fortifications as a basic element of the maneuvered warfare.He aimed to paralyze McClellan's Union Arm in the front, in order to be able to suddenly hit them in the flanks and rear.Furthermore Lee was able to exploit the well known McClellan's endless indecision and cautiousness leaving him uncertain about Confederate forces he had to face and their objectives. In so doing Lee was able to constantly maintain the initiative upon his opponent inflicting him many defeats and finally making him give up his offensive against Richmond.
Union General George B. McClellan did not believe that using Washington DC as a solid base of operations for an assault on Richmond was a wise military action. He was well aware of the fact that US President Lincoln was in favor of this. Lincoln, Radical Republicans and Northern newspapers had continued to push for this from the beginning of the war. And, since the Union defeat in the first Battle Run, the military situation had changed. With that said, McClellan envisioned an attack by his Army of the Potomac from Washington DC. His forces could assault the Rebel's fortified positions at Centreville and Manassas , or else proceed with a movement to turn one or both flanks of those entrenchments, or use a combination of both tactics. McClellan, however saw problems with this. He did not believe that this could be decisive. Certainly his army might bring victory at that point, and bring with it positive results in that these were key Confederate defensive positions. With that said, he did not believe the desired results would bring about the destruction of the eastern Confederate forces, nor help end the war quickly, as everyone still desired. He was certain that the Rebels would manage an effective retreat pattern, and be in a position to mount a counter offensive. The result would be continued offensives and counter offensives. Additionally, even if the Rebels were not able to protect their outer defensives, and retreat to Richmond, there was another problem to face. The Union pursuit would be difficult in that the Confederates would destroy rail lines and bridges as they fell back. Anticipated lethal entrenchments protecting Richmond from the north would force him ( McClellan ) to adopt an alternative and this would take precious time. Too much time. In summary, a direct attack on Richmond and the extra time its defenses would generate would cause or allow a dangerous concentration of Rebel forces with which to deal with. And, McClellan's supply and communication lines were all targets from various positions the Rebels might attack from in the territories between Richmond and Washington DC.
General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
General Lee won the war in a funny way. He put steeping stones to keep his troops out of Richmond.
McDowell was replaced by George B. McClellan.
President Lincoln saw the Confederate retreat back to Virginia after the Battle of Antietam as an opportunity to severely damage the Confederate army in Virginia. He urged General McClellan to rapidly pursue Lee's army into Virginia and cut his lines of communication with Richmond. This would force Lee into another battle with the Army of the Potomac and suffer a defeat due to Lee's smaller army. This would then leave Richmond ripe for a take over.
President Lincoln would have several things to say about his dismissal of General George B. McClellan in 1862. Lincoln informed John Hay that McClellan's refusal to obey the order to advance on October 6, 1862 convinced him that McClellan was not to be trusted to defeat the Rebels in the manner Lincoln had wanted. Lincoln also said that he would have been willing to leave McClellan in command if he would advance before the onset of Winter. This would cut Lee's communications with Richmond. It clearly appears that the former reason is why Lincoln dismissed McClellan.
In July of 1862, in any way possible, General George B. McClellan needed to threaten Richmond to keep the Army of Northern Virginia from concentrating against John Pope's army. If McClellan would not advance or stall with helping Pope, President Lincoln should have replaced him at once and pressure on Richmond from the new general of the Army of the Potomac, fail or succeed, wou;d most likely have saved the Union loss at the Second Battle of Bull Run. Yes, hindsight is always 20-20, however, McClellan had already made many serious errors.
The "Occoquan River Plan" was McClellan's original concept of directly invading Virginia by crossing a Virginia tributary of the Lower Potomac (the Occoquan River) at a point SE of Manassas, VA (site of the earlier Battle of Bull Run). By December, 1861, President Lincoln grew impatient enough to suggest a modified form of the plan, not knowing that McClellan was by then focused on a Peninsular plan to attack Richmond from the east, by transporting Union troops south along Chesapeake Bay. Eventually this plan was changed from a landing at Urbana VA to one farther south at Yorktown, VA. This plan was initiated in March 1862, but by July 1962 the overcautious McClellan could not break through. The North abandoned the campaign and retreated.
A more cautious Confederate general was replaced by the more aggressive Robert E. Lee.