North American Free Trade Agreement
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A trade agreement between Canada, the United States and Mexico that encourages free trade between these North American countries.
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The agreement, implemented on January 1, 1994, is based on the premise that removing as many tariffs as possible between these North American countries will increase trade within the region and benefit each country's economy.
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Learn what both the supporters and critics have to say about this growing global trend. The Globalization Debate
Commitment between Canada, Mexico, and the United States to facilitate cross border movement of goods and services and to protect intellectual property rights. NAFTA became effective January 1, 1994. NAFTA was modeled on "most favored nation" policies. NAFTA was agreed upon to enhance participants' competitiveness in global markets in a manner that protects the environment and labor rights. Presidential candidate Ross Perot, and other opponents of NAFTA, predicted the agreement would send too many U.S. Jobs to Mexico.
Law passed in 1993. Affects trade, investment, and social conscience (environment, labor abuses, retraining). NAFTA is to completely end U.S. And Mexican tariffs and quotas on imports and agricultural products mostly over the mid-1990s, with some requiring 15 years from 1993 to phase out. Applies only to goods made from labor and materials originated within the countries; other imports are acceptable only if they are substantially transformed within the United States, Mexico, or Canada. Major commodities affected are automobiles, textiles and apparel, and agriculture.
Agreement that eliminates tariffs among the United States, Canada, and Mexico over a 15-year period. Approximately 65% of United States agricultural and industrial exports would be eligible for duty-free entry into Mexico and Canada, either on an immediate basis or within five years. This could very well expand insurance operations both south and north of the border.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a treaty that was signed on August 12, 1991 by the United States, Canada, and Mexico; it went into effect on January 1, 1994. (Free trade had existed between the U.S. and Canada since 1989; NAFTA broadened that arrangement.) On that day, the three countries became the largest free market in the world—the economies of the three nations at that time was more than $6 trillion and directly affected more than 365 million people. NAFTA was created to eliminate tariff barriers to agricultural, manufacturing, and services trade, remove investment restrictions, and protect intellectual property rights, all while addressing environmental and labor concerns (although many observers charge that the three governments have been lax in ensuring environmental and labor safeguards since the agreement went into effect). Small businesses were among those that were expected to benefit the most from the lowering of trade barriers since it would make doing business in Mexico and Canada less expensive and would reduce the red tape needed to import or export goods.
Highlights of NAFTA included:
One of the key provisions of NAFTA provided "national goods" status to products imported from other NAFTA countries. No state, provincial, or local governments could impose taxes or tariffs on those goods. In addition, customs duties were either eliminated at the time of the agreement or scheduled to be phased out in five or 10 equal stages. The one exception to the phase out was specified sensitive items, for which the phase-out period would be 15 years.
Supporters championed NAFTA because it opened up Mexican markets to U.S. companies like never before. The Mexican market is growing rapidly, which promises more export opportunities, which in turn means more jobs. Supporters, though, had a difficult time convincing the American public that NAFTA would do more good than harm. Their main effort centered on convincing people that all consumers benefit from the widest possible choice of products at the lowest possible price—which means that consumers would be the biggest beneficiaries of lowered trade barriers. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which represents the interests of small businesses, was one of the most active supporters of NAFTA, organizing the owners and employees of small and mid-size businesses to support the agreement. This support was key in countering the efforts of organized labor to stop the agreement.
Nafta and Small Business
Analysts agree that NAFTA has opened up new opportunities for small and mid-size businesses. Mexican consumers spend more each year on U.S. products than their counterparts in Japan and Europe, so the stakes for business owners are high. (Most of the studies of NAFTA concentrate on the effects of U.S. business with Mexico. Trade with Canada has also been enhanced, but the passage of the trade agreement did not have as great an impact on the already liberal trade practices that America and its northern neighbor abided by.)
Some small businesses were affected directly by NAFTA. In the past, larger firms always had an advantage over small ones because the large companies could afford to build and maintain offices and/or manufacturing plants in Mexico, thereby avoiding many of the old trade restrictions on exports. In addition, pre-NAFTA laws stipulated that U.S. service providers that wanted to do business in Mexico had to establish a physical presence there, which was simply too expensive for small firms to do. Small firms were stuck—they could not afford to build, nor could they afford the export tariffs. NAFTA leveled the playing field by letting small firms export to Mexico at the same cost as the large firms and by eliminating the requirement that a business establish a physical presence in Mexico in order to do business there. The lifting of these restrictions meant that vast new markets were suddenly open to small businesses that had previously done business only in the United States. This was regarded as especially important for small businesses that produced goods or services that had matured in U.S. markets.
Still, small firms interested in conducting business in Mexico have to recognize that Mexican business regulations, hiring practices, employee benefit requirements, taxation schedules, and accounting principles all include features that are unique to that country. Small businesses, then, should familiarize themselves with Mexico's foundation of business rules and traditions—not to mention the demographics culture of the marketplace—before committing resources to this region.
Opposition to Nafta
Much organized opposition to NAFTA centered on the fear that the abolishment of trade barriers would spur U.S. firms to pack up and move to Mexico to take advantage of cheap labor. This concern remains strong among labor unions and other worker organizations. Opposition to NAFTA was also strong among environmental groups, who contended that the treaty's anti-pollution elements were woefully inadequate. This criticism has not abated since NAFTA's implementation. Indeed, both Mexico and Canada have been repeatedly cited for environmental malfeasance.
Controversy over the treaty's environmental enforcement provisions remained strong in the late 1990s. In fact, North American business interests have sought to weaken a key NAFTA side accord on environmental protections and enforcement. This accord—one of the few provisions welcomed by environmental groups—allows groups and ordinary citizens to accuse member nations of failing to enforce their own environmental laws. A trinational Commission for Environmental Cooperation is charged with investigating these allegations and issuing public reports. "That process is slow, but the embarassment factor has proven surprisingly high," noted Business Week. As of mid-2000, the U.S. government has expressed opposition to revisions in the NAFTA agreement. But the Canadian government and many businesses in all three countries continue to work to change this accord.
The Effects of Nafta
Since NAFTA's passage, American business interests have expressed general satisfaction with the agreement. Employment, productivity, and trade have all surged in the 1990s, although analysts point out that these increases can be attributed to myriad factors, of which NAFTA is only one. Moreover, job losses in the U.S. that can be attributed to NAFTA have been minimal. As of 1997, only 117,000 Americans had signed up for the benefits offered to workers displaced by NAFTA.
Change has been most dramatic in Mexico. U.S. firms are setting up joint ventures in Mexico that, for the first time, use local firms for materials and parts. The quality of goods produced in Mexico has gone up, and the biggest beneficiaries are Mexican consumers. Wages and working conditions have also improved in many areas.
Further Reading:
Allen, Mike. "NAFTA Is a Good Treaty, But Could Be Better." San Diego Business Journal. July 21, 1997.
Edmond Jr., Alfred. "Making the Most of NAFTA: Here's What to Do when the Barriers to Mexico's Markets Come Down." Black Enterprise. February 1994.
"A Green Thumb in NAFTA's Eye?" Business Week. June 12, 2000.
Holzinger, Albert G. "Why Small Firms Back NAFTA." Nation's Business. November 1993.
Krueger, Anne O. "NAFTA's Effects: A Preliminary Assessment." World Economy. June 2000.
Ostroff, Jim. "Report: NAFTA Helped Both U.S. and Mexico." WWD. July 14, 1997.
"Taking the Green Out of NAFTA." Business Week. May 29, 2000.
"What NAFTA Means to Small Businesses: Mexico Is an Important Market for Small and Medium Sized U.S. Businesses." Arkansas Business. November 15, 1993.
"When Neighbours Embrace: the NAFTA Effect." The Economist. July 5, 1997.
For more information on NAFTA, visit Britannica.com.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which went into effect in 1948 in the wake of World War II, sought to expand free trade by reducing tariffs between the twenty-three signatory nations. A strong supporter of GATT throughout its history, the United States in 1986 began to urge that GATT move beyond the reduction of trade barriers and that its agenda include foreign investment, services, agriculture, and intellectual property rights.
Increasing competition from Pacific and European countries caused the United States to begin trying to assemble a dollar-dominated block in the American hemisphere. This desire led first to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Canada, effective January 1989, and then to an expanded trilateral agreement with Canada and Mexico, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), effective January 1994. Given the earlier agreement between the United States and Canada, NAFTA dealt primarily with restructuring trade between the United States and Mexico and between Mexico and Canada. All tariffs between the United States and Canada would end by the year 1998; those between the United States and Mexico would be eliminated by 2008.
The agreements, however, much like the expanded agenda for GATT, covered more than the elimination of trade barriers and led to divisive debate in all three countries. Concerns among Canadians in 1988 and Mexicans in 1992 reflected a lingering view of the United States as a powerful nation that might yet seek to swallow up or strangle its neighbors. While some critics employed a powerful emotional rhetoric reminiscent of the days when the United States was roundly condemned as the Colossus of the North, others focused on the perceived need to protect Canadian and Mexican sovereignty, which they saw as threatened by expanded U.S. investment in such crucial national resources as oil and in institutions such as banking. Given the unequal status between them and their powerful neighbor, these opponents argued, both Canada and Mexico risked becoming in effect economic colonies of the United States.
In 1988 Canadians voiced many of the same concerns expressed by labor leaders and environmentalists in the United States in the early 1990s. Because Canada was already part of GATT, Canadians questioned the necessity of the FTA and the benefit to Canada of tying itself more closely to the largest debtor nation in the world. They argued that the movement of jobs from Canada to the United States, already a problem because of lower U.S. labor costs, would accelerate and that Canada's higher standards of environmental regulation and social programs would be threatened by U.S. investment and business practices. By far the most emotional issue in all three countries was the effect of NAFTA on employment. While proponents of NAFTA stressed that implementation would create jobs, opponents argued that the accord would lead to job loss. The negotiations commenced and continued during a period of global recession and high unemployment. While the movement of jobs from Canada to the United States and from the United States to Mexico had preceded the FTA and NAFTA negotiations, labor groups in both the United States and Canada were unshakable in their opposition.
As the leaders of both Mexico and the United States sought to assuage the fears of those at home who opposed NAFTA, the fate of the pact had implications beyond the borders of North America in the early 1990s. When President George Bush and Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari announced in June 1990 the possibility of a free trade agreement between Mexico and the United States, Bush also announced the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which envisioned a free-trade block stretching from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego. This announcement preceded a dizzying number of new trading alignments within Latin America, including the agreement among Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay in March 1991 to establish MERCOSUR, which pledged to integrate their economies by 1995, and numerous framework trade agreements between the United States and its southern neighbors.
The creation of a multinational trading bloc was a political and economic project. By the early 1990s, Latin American leaders had come to see the opportunity to move closer to the United States economically as a way to move their countries politically along a modern path of reform. At stake, then, was more than an economic reordering of the relationship among the three North American countries; there was also a foreign policy objective: strengthening political ties throughout the hemisphere. The U.S. Congress approved NAFTA in November 1993. A complicated and cumbersome document largely unread by proponents and opponents alike, it included concessions from all the parties because the United States, Mexico, and Canada saw in it an opportunity to promote their own economies, and protect the frailest components of those economies.
Bibliography
Bowker, Marjorie Montgomery. On Guard for Thee: An Independent Analysis, Based on the Actual Test of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. Hull, Quebec: Voyageur, 1988.
Bulmer-Thomas, Victor, Nikki Craske, and Monica Serrano, eds. Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement: Who Will Benefit? New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.
Cavanagh, John, et al., eds. Trading Freedom: How Free Trade Affects Our Lives, Work, and Environment. San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1992.
A trade agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, which took effect January 1, 1994. Its purpose is to increase the efficiency and fairness of trade between the three nations.
At the heart of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a simple goal: the elimination of tariffs — the taxes each nation imposes on the others' imports — and other bureaucratic and legal barriers to trade. In addition to its central terms, the massive, highly detailed agreement also includes so-called side agreements intended to ensure that each nation enforces its own labor and environmental laws. The bulk of its regulations are to be phased in over the course of fifteen years.
The impetus for NAFTA developed in the 1980s. Its roots lie in the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement of 1988 — implemented by the United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement Implementation Act (19 U.S.C.A. § 2112 note [Supp. 1993]) — which, by the mid-1990s, had already eliminated most trade barriers between the United States and Canada. With the world gradually becoming divided into large regional trading blocs where goods and services move freely, as in the European Union, NAFTA's supporters saw the inclusion of Mexico as necessary for North America to compete internationally.
In the United States, debate over NAFTA threatened to derail it. Proponents saw economic benefits for all three nations in the agreement. But opponents concentrated their attack on the implications for the relationship between the United States and Mexico. They feared two potential outcomes if NAFTA were signed: the loss of U.S. jobs, and damage to the environment as a result of economic growth in Mexico and the likelihood that U.S. safety regulations would be challenged as barriers to free trade.
In 1993 a coalition of consumer and environmental groups brought suit in an attempt to block congressional consideration of the agreement. In Public Citizen v. United States Trade Representative, 5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir. 1993), the coalition argued that the administration of President Bill Clinton had failed to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 4321 et seq. [1977]), which requires all federal agencies to submit environmental impact statements for all legislation or actions that affect the environment. The suit failed when a federal appellate court ruled that it had no authority to review the president's actions.
In response to anti-NAFTA criticisms, the White House negotiated three side agreements that were signed on September 14, 1993. The side agreements attempted to ensure that the three countries comply with their own labor and environmental laws; established fines and limited trade sanctions for violations; and called for consultations by the members if increases in imports from one country appeared to be having a devastating effect on an industry in one of the other countries. Two months later NAFTA won congressional approval. The House of Representatives narrowly passed the implementing legislation (North American Free Trade Implementation Act [19 U.S.C.A. § 3314 et seq., Pub. L. No. 103-182, 107 Stat. 2057]), and the Senate also passed it.
NAFTA specifies a timetable for its changes. When the agreement went into effect on January 1, 1994, the United States eliminated all tariffs on 60 percent of imports from Mexico that previously were subject to tariffs. On January 1, 2003, more U.S. tariffs on Mexico's imports will be removed, with the result that 92 percent of previously taxed Mexican goods will be able to enter the United States without tariffs. Finally, on January 1, 2008, all remaining tariffs on the three countries' goods will be eliminated. Other barriers are to be removed by January 1, 2000. U.S. banks, which have hitherto been shut out of Mexico, will be free to take over as much as 15 percent of the Mexican financial market. At the same time, Mexican and U.S. truck drivers will be allowed to haul goods across the border and deliver them anywhere in either country.
| Meaning | Category |
| Βορειοαερικανική Ζώνη Ελευθέρου Επορίου | International->Greek |
| Never Attack Fighting Tigers Again | Miscellaneous->Funnies |
| No American Factories Taking Applications | Miscellaneous->Funnies |
| No American Farm Trade Anymore | Business->International Business |
| North African Federated Trade Association | Business->International Business |
| North African Free Trade Act | Business->International Business |
| North American Free Trade Agreement | Business->General Governmental->Military Business->International Business Academic & Science->Ocean Science Governmental->Transportation Governmental->US Government Business->Accounting Business->Mortgage |
| North American Free Trade Area | Governmental->US Government |
| North American Frog Throwing Act | Miscellaneous->Funnies |
| North American Future Teachers Association | Academic & Science->Universities |
| Not Actually Fabricated Totally American | Miscellaneous->Funnies |
| Nullified Artisans Federation of Trecherous Adults | Miscellaneous->Funnies |
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An agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico to establish free trade. It took effect in 1994 and is designed to eliminate trade barriers between the three nations by 2009.
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The North American
Free Trade Agreement Accord de libre-échange nord-américain Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte |
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| Secretariats | Mexico City, Ottawa and Washington, D.C. | |||
| Official languages | English, French and Spanish | |||
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| - | Formation | 1 January 1994 | ||
| Website http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org |
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The North American Free Trade Agreement (French: Accord de libre-échange nord-américain (ALENA)) (Spanish: Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte (TLCAN)) is the trade bloc in North America created by the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its two supplements, the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and The North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC), whose members are Canada, Mexico, and the United States. It came into effect on 1 January 1994.
The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) eliminated the majority of tariffs between products traded among the United States, Canada and Mexico, and gradually phases out other tariffs over a 15-year period. Restrictions were to be removed from many categories, including motor vehicles, computers, textiles, and agriculture. The treaty also protects intellectual property rights (patents, copyrights, and trademarks), and outlines the removal of investment restrictions among the three countries. The agreement is trilateral in nature (that is, the terms apply equally to all countries) in all areas except agriculture, in which stipulations, tariff reduction phase-out periods and protection of selected industries, were negotiated on a bilateral basis. Provisions regarding worker and environmental protection were added later as a result of supplemental agreements signed in 1993.
NAFTA was an expansion of the earlier Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1988. Unlike the European Union, NAFTA does not create a set of supranational governmental bodies, nor does it create a body of law superior to national law. NAFTA is a treaty under international law, though under United States law it is classed as a congressional-executive agreement rather than a treaty.
The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) was a response to environmentalists' concerns that companies would either relocate to Mexico, or the United States would lower its standards if the three countries did not achieve consistent environmental regulation. The NAAEC only obligates parties to enforce their own environmental laws. It does not create substantive standards for environmental regulation.[citation needed] The NAAEC, in an endeavour to be more than a set of environmental regulations, established the North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation (NACEC), a mechanism for addressing trade and environmental issues, the North American Development Bank (NADBank) for assisting and financing investments in pollution reduction, and the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC). The NADBank and the BECC have provided economic benefits to Mexico by financing 36 projects, mostly in the water sector.[1] By complementing NAFTA with the NAAEC, it has been labeled the "greenest" trade agreement; though being a pioneer in this area, it was not hard for the agreement to be labeled "green".
The North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (NAALC) supplements NAFTA and endeavours to create a foundation for cooperation among the three countries for the resolution of labour problems, as well as to promote greater cooperation among trade unions and social organizations in order to fight for improved labour conditions. Though most economists agree that it is difficult to assess the direct impact of the NAALC, it is agreed that there has been a convergence of labour standards in North America. Given its limitations, however, NAALC has not produced (and in fact was not intended to achieve)convergence in employment, productivity and salary trends in North America.
While different groups advocate for a further integration into a North American Community, sensitive issues have hindered that process. The three countries have pursued different trade policies with non-members (for example, Mexico has signed FTAs with more than 40 countries in 12 agreements), making the possibility of creating a customs union difficult to accomplish. President Vicente Fox, of Mexico, had promoted the idea of enhancing NAFTA (into what he labeled "Nafta-Plus", or possibly a North American Community), but after the attacks of 9/11, priorities in the United States changed. The Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America was signed, instead, as a separate and unrelated agreement.
Given the scope of the agreement, which includes very sensitive issues in trade talks such as agriculture liberalization and environment regulation, few countries have shown interest in joining NAFTA. Instead, some countries, like Chile, preferred to negotiate three separate bilateral agreements with the three current NAFTA members, with different restrictions to liberalization of their industries and the regulation of environment protection.
During 2000-2002, some British politicians, particularly on the right, showed an interest in joining NAFTA, as an alternative to the European Union, which, through conformity in many social, welfare and economic aspects, was seen as restrictive to British interest. Being a key member in the latter bloc, there was much opposition to this move.[2] In a similar way, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago also showed a similar interest.[3]
In an interview with Larry King on October 8, 2007, former Mexican president Vincente Fox acknowledged the plan for a North American single currency, referring to his and President Bush's support for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) as a "first step" toward "a new vision" for the Americas, "like we are trying to do with NAFTA."[4]
NAFTA was initially pursued by conservative governments in the United States and Canada supportive of free trade, led by Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, U.S. President George H. W. Bush, and the Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari. The three countries signed NAFTA in December 1992, subject to ratification by the legislatures of the three countries. There was considerable opposition in all three countries, but in the United States it was able to secure passage after Bill Clinton made its passage a major legislative initiative in 1993. During his presidential campaign he had promised to review the agreement, which he considered inadequate. Since the agreement had been signed by Bush under his fast-track prerogative, Clinton did not alter the original agreement, but complemented it with the aforementioned NAAEC and NAALC. After intense political debate and the negotiation of these side agreements, the U.S. House passed NAFTA by 234-200 (132 Republicans and 102 Democrats voting in favor, 156 Democrats, 43 Republicans, and 1 independent against).[5] and the U.S. Senate passed it by 61-38[6]
The benefits of NAFTA have been quantified by several economists, whose findings have been reported in several publications like the World Bank's Lessons from NAFTA for Latin America and the Caribbean,[7] NAFTA's Impact on North America,[8] and NAFTA Revisited by the Institute for International Economics.[9] Most agree that NAFTA has been positive for Mexico, which has seen its poverty rates fall and real income rise, even after accounting for the 1994–1995 economic crisis. Nonetheless, the majority agree that NAFTA has not been enough (or worked fast enough) to produce an economic convergence[10] (which is hardly surprising given the initial economic disparity between Mexico and the United States/Canada), nor to substantially reduce poverty rates. Some have suggested that in order to fully benefit from the agreement, Mexico must invest more in education and promote innovation in infrastructure and agriculture.
Trade has increased dramatically among the three nations since NAFTA. In the period of 1993–2004, total trade between the United States and its NAFTA partners increased 129.3% (110.1% with Canada and 100.9% with Mexico), yet total trade between the United States and non-NAFTA partners increased 123.8% in the same period, a roughly similar figure.[citation needed] According to Hufbauer (2005), overall, NAFTA has not caused trade diversion, aside from a few select industries such as textiles and apparel, in which rules of origin negotiated in the agreement were specifically designed to make U.S. firms prefer Mexican manufacturers. The World Bank also showed that the aggregate NAFTA imports' percentage growth was accompanied by an almost similar increase of non-NAFTA imports, thus suggesting that increase in trade was not diversionary.[citation needed]
Maquiladoras (Mexican factories which take in imported raw materials and produce goods for export) have become the landmark of trade in Mexico. Hufbauer's (2005) book shows that real income in the maquiladora sector has increased 15.5% since the implementation of NAFTA in 1994. Nonetheless, trade from the non-maquiladora sector has grown much faster.[citation needed] As the book suggests, and contrary to popular belief, this should be no surprise since maquiladora's products from border states could enter the United States duty-free since the 1960's industry agreement. Other sectors now benefit from the free trade agreement, and the share of exports from non-border states has increased in the last five years while the share of exports from maquiladora-border states has decreased. This phenomenon has allowed for the rapid growth of non-border metropolitan areas, such as Toluca, León and Puebla; all three larger in population than Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez. The main non-maquiladora industry that has benefited from NAFTA is the automobile industry, whose standards of quality are internationally recognized (having to comply to U.S., European Union, and Japanese standards). The main automobile industries are located in Puebla, Saltillo, Querétaro and Guanajuato.[citation needed] Also, NAFTA permitted the growth of high-tech exports, which, according to the World Bank, in 2004, represented 21% of total industrial exports, the highest percentage in Latin America.[citation needed]
The auto and auto parts trade is by far the most important sector within NAFTA- it represents 20% of total intra-NAFTA trade. Mexico has successfully integrated their auto industries into the existing market between the US and Canada, which had been integrated since the 1965 Auto Pact and enhanced by CUSFTA, NAFTA's predecessor.[citation needed]
From the perspective of North American consumers, one of the effects of NAFTA has been the significant increase in bilingual (and often trilingual) labeling on products for simultaneous distribution through retailers in Canada, the United States, and Mexico in French, English, and Spanish.[citation needed]
From the earliest negotiations, agriculture was (and remains) a controversial topic within NAFTA, as it has been with almost all free trade agreements that have been signed within the WTO framework. Agriculture is the only section that was not negotiated trilaterally; instead, three separate agreements were signed between each pair of parties. The Canada-U.S. agreement contains significant restrictions and tariff quotas on agricultural products (mainly sugar, dairy, and poultry products), whereas the Mexico-U.S. pact allows for a wider liberalization within a framework of phase-out periods (which is surprising, since it was the first North-South FTA on agriculture to be signed).
The overall effect of the Mexico-U.S. agricultural agreement is a matter of dispute. Some argue that the effects have been devastating to peasants, given that Mexico did not invest in the infrastructure necessary for competition (such as efficient railroads and highways). Still, the causes of rural poverty cannot be directly attributed to NAFTA; in fact, Mexico's agricultural exports increased 9.4% annually between 1994 and 2001, while imports increased by only 6.9% a year during the same period.[11] Others have pointed out that Mexico is suffering an adjustment typical of international trade theory, and that sectors with competitive advantage (mainly horticultural products and tropical fruits) have greatly benefited from the agreement, while others (like the corn sector) have not, and that this was expected (and promoted) by Mexican authorities while NAFTA was being negotiated.[12]
In fact, production of corn in Mexico has actually increased since NAFTA's implementation. However, internal corn demand has increased beyond Mexico's sufficiency, and imports have become necessary, far beyond the quotas Mexico had originally negotiated.[13] Zahniser & Coyle have also pointed out that corn prices in Mexico, adjusted for international prices, have drastically decreased, yet through a program of direct income transfer (a subsidy) expanded by former president Vicente Fox, production has remained stable since 2000.[14] The logical result of a lower commodity price is that more use of it is made downstream. Unfortunately, many of the same rural people who would have been likely to produce higher-margin value-added products in Mexico have instead emigrated. Perhaps the rise in corn prices due to increased ethanol demand will improve the situation of corn farmers in Mexico.
Milton Friedman has argued that the North American Free Trade Agreement is actually not a "free trade" agreement, but rather is government managed trade.[15] The essence of this criticism is that such trade agreements don't promote free trade, they inhibit it by implementing another level of bureaucracy on top of national governments. This can not only have a detrimental effect on trade, it results in an erosion of sovereignty for all nations involved and causes citizens and governments to be bound by decisions made by an unelected international body.
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There is some concern in Canada over the provision that if something is sold even once as a commodity, the government cannot stop its sale in the future.[dubious ] This applies to the water from Canada's lakes and rivers, fueling fears over the possible destruction of Canadian ecosystems and water supply.
Other fears come from the effects NAFTA has had on Canadian lawmaking. In 1996, MMT, a gasoline additive that some studies had linked to nerve damage, was brought into Canada by an American company. The Canadian federal government banned the importation of the additive. The American company brought a claim under NAFTA Chapter 11 seeking US$201 million [16], and by Canadian Provinces under the Agreement on Internal Trade ("AIT"). The American company argued that their additive had not been conclusively linked to any health dangers, and that the prohibition was damaging to their company. Following a finding that the ban was a violation of the AIT [17], the Canadian federal government repealed the ban and settled with the American company for US$13 million[18].
The United States and Canada had been arguing for years over the United States' decision to impose a 27% duty on Canadian softwood lumber imports, until new Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper compromised with the United States and reached a settlement on July 1, 2006 [19], though the settlement has not yet been ratified by either country, in part due to domestic opposition in Canada. Canada had filed numerous motions to have the duty eliminated and the collected duties returned to Canada[20]. After the United States lost an appeal from a NAFTA panel, it responded by saying "We are, of course, disappointed with the [NAFTA panel's] decision, but it will have no impact on the anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders", (Neena Moorjani, spokeswoman for U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman[21]. Most recently, on July 21, 2006, the U.S. Court of International Trade found that imposition of the duties was contrary to U.S. law[22][23]. The U.S.'s apparent failure to comply with various rulings against it in this case has generated widespread political debate in Canada.
It should be noted that an increase in domestic manufacturing output and a proportionally greater domestic investment in manufacturing does not necessarily mean an increase in domestic manufacturing jobs-- it may simply reflect greater automation and higher productivity. Although the U.S. total civilian employment rate may have grown by almost 15 million in between 1993 and 2001, manufacturing jobs only increased by 476,000 between January 1, 1994 and January 1, 2001 [24]. Furthermore from 1994 to 2007, net manufacturing employment has declined by 3,654,000, and during this period several other free trade agreements have been concluded or expanded [25].
Several studies have concluded that NAFTA has destroyed hundreds of thousands of agricultural jobs in Mexico[citation needed]. An influx of imports has decreased the prices for Mexican corn by more than 70% since 1994[citation needed]. As a result, of the 15 million Mexicans who depend on the crop, many can no longer afford basic health care and the labor demanded of them has been increased[citation needed]. NAFTA has been criticized for allowing U.S. agricultural subsidies to artificially depress corn prices[citation needed]. In 2000, U.S. government subsidies to the corn sector totaled $10.1 billion, a figure ten times greater than the total Mexican agricultural budget that year.[26] Other studies reject NAFTA as the force responsible for depressing the incomes of poor corn farmers, citing the trend's existence more than a decade before NAFTA's existence, an increase in maize production after NAFTA went into effect in 1994, and the lack of a measurable impact on the price of Mexican corn due to subsidized corn coming into Mexico from the United States, though they agree that the abolishment of U.S. agricultural subsidies would benefit Mexican farmers.[27] So would having the rural Mexican farmers use their corn as a raw material instead of trying to sell it as an end product. Shipment out of rural areas adds a level of expense that reduces what they receive on sales of their corn. Cost of shipment also protects local producers from outside competition. An end product that costs more per pound results in more going to the farmers.
Bodies of scholarship in fields such as American, ethnic, Chicano/a, and globalization studies have examined the proliferation of human rights abuses in maquiladoras along the U.S.-Mexico border in connection with the ratification of NAFTA. In the period from then to 2001, upwards of 300 women have been murdered, some brutally violated and their bodies mutilated, some 400 have disappeared, and others have been tortured in connection with the maquiladoras and to maximize the productivity of the labor force, primarily in the vicinity of the border city of Ciudad Juárez, Chihuahua, across the border from El Paso, Texas. Chicana feminist scholars including Rosalinda Fregoso link such activities and policies to a phenomenon they call feminicide. Their critique is much broader than NAFTA itself and encompasses economic patriarchy and globalization; the premise for the connection between NAFTA and the recent exacerbation of these human rights abuses is based on Mexico's entry into the global, neoliberal economy enacted by NAFTA.[28]
However, other scholars refute such connections. William C. Gruben finds no significant contribution by NAFTA to the fluctuations in maquiladora employment. He finds that maquiladoras' post-NAFTA growth is connected to changes in Mexican wages relative to those in Asia and the United States and to fluctuations in U.S. industrial production. These connections are consistent with the declining maquiladora employment seen in 2001, as U.S. industrial production fell, and contrary to a connection to NAFTA.[29]
Given the overall size of trade between Canada, Mexico and the United States, there are remarkably few trade disputes, and the ones that do arise involve relatively small amounts of money. These disputes are generally settled in WTO or NAFTA panels or through negotiations between the two countries. The most significant areas of friction involve trucking, sugar, high fructose corn syrup, and a number of other agricultural products (e.g. avocados.)
The United States and Canadian governments have had an ongoing dispute over the United States' decision to impose a 27% duty on Canadian softwood lumber imports. Canada has filed numerous motions to have the duty eliminated and the collected duties returned to Canada. Canada has won every case brought before the NAFTA tribunal, the last being on March 18, 2006. The United States responded by saying "We are, of course, disappointed with the [NAFTA panel's] decision, but it will have no impact on the anti-dumping and countervailing duty orders", (Neena Moorjani, spokeswoman for U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman). This presumed failure of the United States to adhere to the terms of the treaty has generated widespread political debate in Canada. The debate includes imposing countervailing duties on American products, and possibly shutting off all or some energy shipments, such as natural gas.
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Another contentious issue is the impact of the investment obligations contained in Chapter 11 of the NAFTA[30]. Chapter 11 allows corporations or individuals to sue Mexico, Canada, or the United States for compensation when actions taken by those governments (or by those for whom they are responsible at international law, such as provincial, state, or municipal governments) have adversely affected their investments.
This chapter has been invoked in cases where governments have passed laws or regulations with intent to protect their constituents and their resident businesses' profits. Language in the chapter defining its scope states that it cannot be used to "prevent a Party from providing a service or performing a function such as law enforcement, correctional services, income security or insurance, social security or insurance, social welfare, public education, public training, health, and child care, in a manner that is not inconsistent with this Chapter.[31]"
This also accounts for the high volume of debt which is increased in the Mexican environments throughout the country and the various manifestos that implement themselves on this particular view.
This chapter has been criticized by groups in the U.S.[32]", Mexico [33] and Canada[34] for a variety of reasons, including not taking into account important social and environmental considerations. In Canada, several groups, including the Council of Canadians, challenged the constitutionality of Chapter 11. They lost at the trial level[35], and have subsequently appealed.
Methanex, a Canadian corporation, filed a US$970 million suit against the United States, claiming that a California ban on MTBE, a substance that had found its way into many wells in the state, was hurtful to the corporation's sales of methanol. However, the claim was rejected, and the company was ordered to pay US$3 million to the U.S. government in costs[36].
In another case Metalclad, an American corporation, was awarded US$15.6 million from Mexico after a Mexican municipality refused a construction permit for the hazardous waste landfill it intended to construct in El Llano, Aguascalientes. The construction had already been approved by the federal government with various environmental requirements imposed (see paragraph 48 of the tribunal decision). The NAFTA panel found that the municipality did not have the authority to ban construction on the basis of the alleged environmental concerns[37]
Further, it has been argued that the chapter benefits the interests of Canadian and American corporations disproportionately more than Mexican businesses, which often lack the resources to pursue a suit against the much wealthier states.[citation needed]
Also contentious is NAFTA's Chapter 19, which subjects antidumping and countervailing duty determinations with binational panel review instead of, or in addition to, conventional judicial review. For example, in the United States, review of agency decisions imposing antidumping and countervailing duties are normally heard before the U.S. Court of International Trade, an Article III court. NAFTA parties, however, have the option of appealing the decisions to binational panels composed of five citizens from the two relevant NAFTA countries. The panelists are generally lawyers experienced in international trade law. The panel is charged with determining whether agency determinations involving antidumping and countervailing duties comport with the NAFTA country's domestic law. Chapter 19 is unique in international dispute settlement in that it applies a country's own law rather than international law.
A Chapter 19 panel is expected to examine whether the agency's determination is supported by "substantial evidence." This standard assumes significant deference to the domestic agency.
Some of the most controversial trade disputes in recent years such as the U.S.-Canada softwood lumber dispute have been litigated before Chapter 19 panels.
Decisions by Chapter 19 panels can be challenged before a NAFTA extraordinary challenge committee. However, an extraordinary challenge committee does not function as an ordinary appeal. Under the NAFTA, it will only vacate or remand a decision if the decision involves a significant and material error that threatens the integrity of the NAFTA dispute settlement system. As of January 2006, no NAFTA party has successfully challenged a Chapter 19 panel's decision before an extraordinary challenge committee.
Public opinion in Mexico, Canada and the United States tends to be positive toward NAFTA. A July 2004 survey conducted by CIDE and COMEXI in Mexico showed that 64% of the Mexican public favored NAFTA. The Program on International Policy Attitudes reported in a January 2004 poll that 47% of Americans thought that NAFTA has been good for the United States, while 39% thought it had been bad for the country.[38]
A Canadian poll conducted in June 2003 by Ipsos Reid found that 70% of Canadians supported NAFTA, while only 26% were opposed. However, a May 2004 Ipsos poll found that "Six In Ten Canadians (62%) Disagree That Canada Should Sign A Trade Agreement That Would Open Canada’s Public Services to Competition From Foreign Companies" and "A Further Six In Ten (60%) Disagree That Government Should Sign Deals That Would Allow Corporations to Directly Sue The Government of Canada If Our Public Policies Impair Their Ability to Make Profits".[2]
Despite their support for NAFTA, the polls in Canada and Mexico have tended to show that citizens see their own country as the loser in NAFTA, and to see the United States as the winner. The U.S. public has viewed Mexico as the winner and has been narrowly divided about whether the United States is a winner or loser in NAFTA.[39]
Border restrictions were largely unaffected by the 1988 Free Trade Agreement, and NAFTA gave mobility rights to only listed professionals.[40] As well, the border has been tightened in recent years in response to concerns about drugs and then terrorism. This freedom of mobility has had important qualifications, however. It can be suspended or terminated by either government at will.
In 2000, then-Mexican President Vicente Fox advocated the idea of free flow of people across the U.S.-Mexico border as a second phase of NAFTA, which would be completed in ten years. However, negotiations ceased after the September 11, 2001 attacks, when debate in the United States shifted towards an immigration policy with security as its main goal.
Developments in early 2006 brought the Mexican-U.S. border and United States immigration debate to the center stage in American politics. On May 17, 2006, the Senate passed a bill proposing that a mile ( km) triple-layered fence would be built along the Mexican border to slow down illegal border crossings. However, illegal immigrants already in the country would be provided a way forward to stay and gain citizenship. The new scheme would also provide up to 200,000 placements per year for guest workers. On May 24, 2006, the Senate moved to close the debate on immigration.