Direct democracy, classically termed pure democracy,[1] comprises a form of democracy and theory of civics wherein sovereignty is lodged in the assembly of all
citizens who choose to participate. Depending on the particular system, this assembly might
pass executive motions (decrees), make law, elect and dismiss officials and conduct trials. Where the assembly elected officials,
these were executive agents or direct representatives (bound to the will of the people).
Direct democracy stand in contrast to representative democracy, where
sovereignty is exercised by a subset of the people, elected periodically, but otherwise free to advance their own agendas. These
two forms of democracy can be combined into representative direct
democracy, where elected representatives vote on the behalf of citizens, as long as they do not choose to vote
themselves.
Direct democracy also deals with how citizens are "directly" involved with voting for various laws, instead of voting for
representative to decide for them.
Modern direct democracy is characterized by three pillars:
The second pillar can include the ability to hold a binding referendum on whether a given law should be scrapped. This
effectively grants the populace a veto on government legislation. The third pillar gives the people the right to recall elected
officials by petition and referendum.
Other institutions exist which are regarded as being directly democratic in character. In particular, the use of
sortition to fill posts in government or decision making bodies and the formation of
Citizen Assemblies for collective decision
making (British Columbia and Ontario have used such
assemblies to come up with proposals for new voting systems[1][2]).
Examples
Switzerland provides the strongest example of modern direct democracy, as it exhibits the
first two pillars at both the local and federal levels. In the past 120 years more than 240 initiatives have been put to
referendum. The populace has been conservative, approving only about 10% of the initiatives put before them; in addition, they
have often opted for a version of the initiative rewritten by government. (See Direct democracy in Switzerland below.)
Another distinctive example comes from the United States, where, despite being a
federal republic where no direct democracy exists at the federal level, over half the
states (and many localities) provide for citizen-sponsored ballot initiatives (also called
"ballot measures" or "ballot questions") and the vast majority of the states have either initiatives and/or referendums. (See
Direct democracy in the United States below.)
Some of the issues surrounding the related notion of a direct democracy using the Internet
and other communications technologies are dealt with in e-democracy. More concisely, the
concept of open source governance applies principles of the free software movement to the governance of people, allowing the entire populace to participate
in government directly, as much or as little as they please. This development strains the traditional concept of democracy,
because it does not give equal representation to each person. Some implementations may even be considered democratically-inspired
meritocracies, where contributers to the code of laws are given preference based on their
ranking by other contributers.
Also relevant is the history of Roman democracy beginning circa 449 BC (Cary, 1967). The ancient Roman Republic's "citizen lawmaking"—citizen formulation and passage of law, as
well as citizen veto of legislature-made law—began about 449 BC and lasted the approximately four hundred years to the death of
Julius Caesar in 44 BC. Many historians mark the end of the
Republic on the passage of a law named the Lex Titia, 27
November 43 BC (Cary, 1967).
Since Athenian democracy, however, this form of government has rarely been used
(some governments have implemented it in part but few as fully as in ancient Athens). Modern mass-suffrage democracies generally rely on representatives elected by citizens (that is, representative democracy).
Modern-era citizen lawmaking began in the towns of Switzerland in the 13th century. In
1847, the Swiss added the "statute referendum" to their national constitution. They soon discovered
that merely having the power to veto Parliament's laws was not enough. In 1891, they added the
"constitutional amendment initiative". The Swiss political battles since 1891 have given the world a valuable experience base
with the national-level constitutional amendment initiative (Kobach, 1993).
Many political movements seek to restore some measure of direct democracy or a
more deliberative democracy (based on consensus decision-making rather than simple majority rule). Such movements advocate more
frequent public votes and referendums on issues, and less of the so-called "rule by politician". Collectively, these movements are referred to as advocating grassroots democracy or consensus democracy, to
differentiate it from a simple direct democracy model. Another related movement is community
politics which seeks to engage representatives with communities directly.
The anarchist movement has advocated forms of direct democracy as an alternative to the
centralized state and capitalism.
Arguments for direct democracy
Arguments in favor of direct democracy tend to focus on perceived flaws in the alternative, representative democracy:
- Non representation. Individuals elected to office in a representative democracy tend not to be demographically
representative of their constituency. They tend to be wealthier and more educated, and are also more predominantly male as well
as members of the majority race, ethnic group, and religion than a random sample would produce. They also tend to be concentrated
in certain professions, such as lawyers. Elections by district may reduce, but not eliminate, those tendencies, in a segregated
society. Direct democracy would be inherently representative, assuming universal suffrage (where everyone can vote). Critics
counter that direct democracy can be unrepresentative, if not all eligible voters participate in every vote, and that this is
lacking voter turnout is not equally distributed among various groups. Greater levels of education, especially regarding law,
seem to have many advantages and disadvantages in lawmaking.
- Conflict of interest. The interests of elected representatives do not necessarily correspond with those of their
constituents. An example is that representatives often get to vote to determine their own salaries. It is in their interest that
the salaries be high, while it is in the interest of the electorate that they be as low as possible, since they are funded with
tax revenue. The typical results of representative democracy are that their salaries are much higher than this average, however.
Critics counter that salaries for representatives are necessary, otherwise only the wealthy could afford to participate.
- Corruption. The concentration of power intrinsic to representative government is seen by some as tending to create
corruption. In direct democracy, the possibility for corruption is reduced.
- Political parties. The formation of political parties is considered by some to be a "necessary evil" of representative
democracy, where combined resources are often needed to get candidates elected. However, such parties mean that individual
representatives must compromise their own values and those of the electorate, in order to fall in line with the party platform.
At times, only a minor compromise is needed. At other times such a large compromise is demanded that a representative will resign
or switch parties. In structural terms, the party system may be seen as a form of oligarchy.
(Hans Köchler, 1995) Meanwhile, in direct democracy, political parties have virtually no effect, as people do not need to conform
with popular opinions. In addition to party cohesion, representatives may also compromise in order to achieve other objectives,
by passing combined legislation, where for example minimum wage measures are combined with tax relief. In order to satisfy one
desire of the electorate, the representative may have to abandon a second principle. In direct democracy, each issue would be
decided on its own merits, and so "special interests" would not be able to include unpopular measures in this way.
- Cost of elections. Many resources are spent on elections which could be applied elsewhere. Furthermore, the need to
raise campaign contributions is felt to seriously damage the neutrality of representatives, who are beholden to major
contributors, and reward them, at the very least, by granting access to government officials. However, direct democracy would
require many more votings, which would be costly, and also probably campaigns by those who may lose or gain from the
results.
- Patronage and nepotism. Elected individuals frequently appoint people to high positions based on their mutual loyalty,
as opposed to their competence. For example, Michael D. Brown was appointed to head the
US Federal Emergency Management Agency, despite a lack of
experience. His subsequent poor performance following Hurricane Katrina may have
greatly increased the number of deaths. In a direct democracy where everybody voted for agency heads, it wouldn't be likely for
them to be elected solely based on their relationship with the voters. On the other hand, most people may have no knowledge of
the candidates and get tired of voting for every agency head. As a result, mostly friends and relatives may vote.
- Lack of transparency. Supporters argue that direct democracy, where people vote directly for issues concerning them,
would result in greater political transparency than representative democracy.
Critics argue that representative democracy can be equally transparent. In both systems people cannot vote on everything, leaving
many decisions to some forms of managers, requiring strong Freedom of
Information legislation for transparency.
- Insufficient sample size. It is often noted that prediction markets most of
the time produce remarkably efficient predictions regarding the future. Many, maybe even most, individuals make bad predictions,
but the resulting average prediction is often surprisingly good. If the same applies to making political decisions, then direct
democracy may produce very efficient decisions.
- Lack of accountability. Once elected, representatives are free to act as they please. Promises made before the
election are often broken, and they frequently act contrary to the wishes of their electorate. Although theoretically it is
possible to have a representative democracy in which the representatives can be recalled at any time; in practice this is usually
not the case. An instant recall process would, in fact, be a form of direct democracy.
- Voter apathy. If voters have more influence on decisions, it is argued that they will take more interest in and
participate more in deciding those issues.[2]
Arguments against direct democracy
- Scale. Direct democracy works on a small system. For example, the Athenian Democracy governed a city of, at its
height, about 30,000 eligible voters (free adult male citizens). Town meetings, a form of
local government once common in New England, has also worked well,
often emphasizing consensus over majority
rule. The use of direct democracy on a larger scale has historically been more difficult, however.[3] Nevertheless, developments in technology
such as the internet, user-friendly and secure software, and inexpensive, powerful personal computers have all inspired new hope
in the practicality of large scale applications of direct democracy.
- Practicality and efficiency. Another objection to direct democracy is that of practicality and efficiency. Deciding
all or most matters of public importance by direct referendum is slow and expensive (especially in a large community), and can
result in public apathy and voter fatigue, especially when
repeatedly faced with the same questions or with questions which are unimportant to the voter. Modern advocates of direct
democracy often suggest e-democracy (sometimes including wikis, television and Internet forums) to address these problems.
- Demagoguery. A fundamental objection to direct democracy is that the public generally gives only superficial attention
to political issues and is thus susceptible to charismatic argument or demagoguery. The counter
argument is that representative democracy causes voters not to pay attention, since each voter's opinion doesn't matter much and
their legislative power is limited. However, if the electorate is large, direct democracy also brings the effect of diminished
vote significance, lacking a majority vote policy.
- One possible solution is demanding that a proposal requires the support of at least 50% of all citizens in order to pass,
effectively meaning that absent voters count as "No" votes. This would prevent minorities from gaining power. However, this still
means that the majority could be swayed by demagoguery. Also, this solution could be used by representative democracy.
- Complexity. A further objection is that policy matters are often so complicated that not all voters understand them.
The average voter may have little knowledge regarding the issues that should be decided. The arduous electoral process in
representative democracies may mean that the elected leaders have above average ability and knowledge. Advocates of direct
democracy argue, however, that laws need not be so complex and that having a permanent ruling class (especially when populated in
large proportion by lawyers) leads to overly complex tax laws, etc. Critics doubt that laws can be extremely simplified and argue
that many issues require expert knowledge. Supporters argue that such expert knowledge could be made available to the voting
public.
- Voter apathy. The average voter may not be interested in politics and therefore may not participate. This immediately
reveals the lack of interest either in the issues themselves or in the options; sometimes people need to redefine the issues
before they can vote either in favor or in opposition. A small amount of voter apathy is always to be expected, and this is not
seen as a problem so long the levels remain constant among (do not target) specific groups of people. That is, if 10% of the
population voted with representative samples from all groups in the population, then in theory, the outcome would be correct.
Nevertheless, the high level of voter apathy would reveal a substantial escalation in voter fatigue and political disconnect. The
risk is, however, that voter apathy would not apply to special interest groups. For example, most farmers may vote for a proposal
to increase agricultural subsidies to themselves while the general population ignore this issue.
If many special interest groups do the same thing, then the resources of the state may be exhausted. One possible solution is
compulsory voting, although this has problems of its own such as restriction of
freedom, costs of enforcement, and random voting.
- Self-interest. The voter will tend to look after his or her own interest rather than considering the needs and values
of a society as a whole. Thus it is very difficult under a system of direct democracy to make a law which benefits a smaller
group if it hurts a larger group, even if the benefit to the small group outweighs that of the larger group. This point is also
an argument in favour of Direct Democracy, as current representative party systems often make decisions that are not in line with
or in favour of the mass of the population, but of a small elite group. Making it difficult to enshrine laws that benefit the
small minority of the ruling class will level the playing field and provide a fair voice for all members of a society. It should
be noted that this is a criticism of democracy in general, but is particularly acute for direct democracy. "Fiscal
responsibility", for instance, is difficult under true direct democracy, as people generally do not wish to pay taxes[citation needed], despite the fact that governments need a source of revenue.
- Suboptimality. Results may be quite different depending on whether people vote on single issues separately in
referendums, or on a number of options bundled together by political parties. As explained in the article on majority rule, the results from voting separately on the issues may be suboptimal, which is a strong
argument against the indiscriminate use of referendums.
- Manipulation by timing and framing. If voters are to decide on an issue in a referendum, a day (or other period of
time) must be set for the vote and the question must be framed, but since the date on which the question is set and different
formulations of the same question evoke different responses, whoever sets the date of the vote and frames the question has the
possibility of influencing the result of the vote.[4]
Direct democracy in Switzerland
In Switzerland, single majorities are sufficient at the town, city, and state
(canton and half-canton) level, but at the national level, "double majorities"
are required on constitutional matters. The intent of the double majorities is simply to ensure any citizen-made law's
legitimacy (Kobach, 1993).
Double majorities are, first, the approval by a majority of those voting, and, second, a majority of states in which a
majority of those voting approve the ballot measure. A citizen-proposed law (i.e. initiative)
cannot be passed in Switzerland at the national level if a majority of the people approve, but a majority of the states
disapprove (Kobach, 1993). For referendums or proposition in general terms (like the principle of a general revision of the
Constitution), the majority of those voting is enough (Swiss constitution, 2005).
In 1890, when the provisions for Swiss national citizen lawmaking were being debated by civil
society and government, the Swiss copied the idea of double majorities from the United
States Congress, in which House votes were to represent the people and Senate votes were to represent the states (Kobach,
1993). According to its supporters, this "legitimacy-rich" approach to national citizen lawmaking has been very successful.
Kobach claims that Switzerland has had tandem successes both socially and economically which are matched by only a few other
nations, and that the United States is not one of them. Kobach states at the end of his book, "Too often, observers deem
Switzerland an oddity among political systems. It is more appropriate to regard it as a pioneer." Finally, the Swiss political
system, including its direct democratic devices in a multi-level governance context, becomes increasingly interesting for
scholars of EU integration (see Trechsel, 2005).
Direct democracy in the United States
-
Direct democracy was very much opposed by the framers of the United States
Constitution and some signers of the Declaration of
Independence. They saw a danger in majorities forcing their will on minorities. As a result, they advocated a
representative democracy in the form of a constitutional republic over a direct democracy. For example, James Madison, in Federalist No. 10 advocates a constitutional
republic over direct democracy precisely to protect the individual from the will of the majority. He says, "A pure democracy can
admit no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will be felt by a majority, and there is nothing to
check the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party. Hence it is, that democracies have ever been found incompatible with
personal security or the rights of property; and have, in general, been as short in their lives as they have been violent in
their deaths." [5] John Witherspoon, one of the signers of
the Declaration of Independence, said "Pure democracy cannot subsist long
nor be carried far into the departments of state — it is very subject to caprice and the madness of popular rage."
Alexander Hamilton said, "That a pure democracy if it were practicable would be the
most perfect government. Experience has proved that no position is more false than this. The ancient democracies in which the
people themselves deliberated never possessed one good feature of government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure
deformity…".
Despite the framers' intentions in the beginning of the republic, ballot measures and their corresponding referendums have
been widely used at the state and sub-state level. There is much state and federal case law,
from the early 1900s to the 1990s, that protects the people's right
to each of these direct democracy governance components (Magleby, 1984, and Zimmerman, 1999). The first United States Supreme Court ruling in favor of the citizen lawmaking was in
Pacific States Telephone and Telegraph Company v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118—in 1912 (Zimmerman, December 1999).
President Theodore Roosevelt,
in his "Charter of Democracy" speech to the 1912 Ohio constitutional convention, stated
"I believe in the Initiative and Referendum, which should be used not to destroy representative government, but to correct it
whenever it becomes misrepresentative."
In various states, referendums through which the people rule include:
- Referrals by the legislature to the people of "proposed constitutional amendments" (constitutionally used in 49
states, excepting only Delaware — Initiative & Referendum Institute, 2004).
- Referrals by the legislature to the people of "proposed statute laws" (constitutionally used in all 50 states —
Initiative & Referendum Institute, 2004).
- Constitutional amendment initiative is the most powerful citizen-initiated, direct democracy governance component. It
is a constitutionally-defined petition process of "proposed constitutional law," which, if successful, results in its provisions
being written directly into the state's constitution. Since constitutional law cannot be altered by state legislatures, this
direct democracy component gives the people an automatic superiority and sovereignty, over representative government (Magelby,
1984). It is utilized at the state level in eighteen states: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota (Cronin, 1989). Among the eighteen
states, there are three main types of the constitutional amendment initiative, with different degrees of involvement of the state
legislature distinguishing between the types (Zimmerman, December 1999).
- Statute law initiative is a constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, petition process of "proposed statute law,"
which, if successful, results in law being written directly into the state's statutes. The statute initiative is used at the
state level in twenty-one states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming (Cronin, 1989). Note that, in Utah, there is
no constitutional provision for citizen lawmaking. All of Utah's I&R law is in the state statutes (Zimmerman, December 1999).
In most states, there is no special protection for citizen-made statutes; the legislature can begin to amend them
immediately.
- Statute law referendum is a constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, petition process of the "proposed veto of all
or part of a legislature-made law," which, if successful, repeals the standing law. It is used at the state level in twenty-four
states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kentucky, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington and Wyoming (Cronin,
1989).
- The recall is a constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, petition process, which, if successful, removes an
elected official from office by "recalling" the official's election. In most state and sub-state jurisdictions having this
governance component, voting for the ballot that determines the recall includes voting for one of a slate of candidates to be the
next office holder, if the recall is successful. It is utilized at the state level in eighteen states: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Washington and Wisconsin (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2004, Recall Of State
Officials).
There are now a total of 34 U.S. states with constitutionally-defined, citizen-initiated, direct democracy governance
components (Zimmerman, December 1999). In the United States, for the most part only one-time majorities are required (simple
majority of those voting) to approve any of these components.
In addition, many localities around the U.S. also provide for some or all of these direct democracy governance components, and
in specific classes of initiatives (like those for raising taxes), there is a supermajority voting threshold requirement. Even in states where direct democracy components are scant or
nonexistent at the state level, there often exists local options for deciding specific
issues, such as whether a county should be "wet" or "dry" in terms of whether alcohol sales are allowed.
In the U.S. region of New England,
nearly all towns practice a very limited form of home rule, and decide local affairs through
the direct democratic process of the town meeting.
Contemporary movements for direct democracy via direct democratic praxis
Some contemporary movements working for direct democracy via direct democratic praxis include:
Notes
See Also
References
- Cary, M. (1967) A History Of Rome: Down To The Reign Of Constantine. St. Martin's Press, 2nd edition.
- Cronin, Thomas E. (1989). Direct Democracy: The Politics Of Initiative, Referendum, And Recall. Harvard University
Press. [Despite the author's bias against direct democracy, the book is a good read for the issues, personalities, and
organizations in the Progressive period of the Reform Era].
- Finley, M.I. (1973). Democracy Ancient And Modern. Rutgers University Press.
- Fotopoulos, Takis, Towards an Inclusive Democracy: The Crisis of the Growth
Economy and the Need for a New Liberatory Project (London & NY: Cassell, 1997).
- Fotopoulos, Takis, The Multidimensional Crisis and Inclusive Democracy. (Athens: Gordios, 2005). (English translation of the book with the same title published in Greek).
- Fotopoulos, Takis, "Liberal and Socialist “Democracies” versus Inclusive Democracy", The International Journal of INCLUSIVE
DEMOCRACY, vol.2, no.2, (January 2006).
- Gerber, Elisabeth R. (1999). The Populist Paradox: Interest Group Influence And The Promise Of Direct Legislation.
Princeton University Press.
- Hansen, Mogens Herman (1999). The Athenian Democracy in the Age of
Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology. University of Oklahoma, Norman (orig. 1991).
- Kobach, Kris W. (1993). The Referendum: Direct Democracy In Switzerland. Dartmouth Publishing Company. [Kobach's title
is somewhat misleading. In addition to Switzerland, he discusses direct democracy in many countries, as well as in
California].
- Köchler, Hans (1995). A Theoretical Examination of the Dichotomy between Democratic Constitutions and Political
Reality. University Center Luxemburg.
- Magleby, David B. (1984). Direct Legislation: Voting On Ballot Propositions In The United States. Johns Hopkins
University Press.
- National Conference of State Legislatures, (2004). Recall Of State Officials
- Polybius (c.150 BC). The Histories. Oxford University, The Great Histories Series, Ed., Hugh R. Trevor-Roper and E.
Badian. Translated by Mortimer Chanbers. Washington Square Press, Inc (1966).
- Trechsel, Alexander H. (2005). "Towards a Federal Europe?" Special issue of the Journal of European Public Policy,
12(3).
- Zimmerman, Joseph F. (March 1999). The New England Town Meeting: Democracy In Action. Praeger Publishers.
- Zimmerman, Joseph F. (December 1999). The Initiative: Citizen Law-Making. Praeger Publishers.
External links
General
Israel
- Kol1 ─ Movement for Direct Democracy In
Israel.
New Zealand
United States
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